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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JESSE B. STONE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
—vs—
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation, J. BRACKEN LEE, JOE
L. CHRISTENSON, L. C ROMNEY,
T. I. GEURTS and J. K. PIERCEY, its
Commissioners, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY, and
GUS P. BACKMAN, its Secretary,
ZIONS SECURITIES CORPORATION, a corporation, and THE
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a corporation sole,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9268

APPEALED FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
The Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered
by The District Court of Salt Lake County upon motions to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dismiss filed by this defendant and similar motions by the
other defendants.
The complaint contains two causes of action. The first
cause of action attacks the sale by the defendant city to defendant Chamber of Commerce of the property presently
housing the police and fire departments of defendant city,
located at First South and State Streets in Salt Lake City.
This property is to be, in turn, conveyed to the United States
for a site for a federal office building. Insofar as this defendant is concerned it is alleged that this defendant has no
right to use what plaintiff calls a trust fund to assist in the
acquisition of the property for a federal building site. The
plaintiff claims such plan is null and void as to this defendant
for six separate reasons. We shall discuss these in our argument.
N o where in the complaint is there any attempt to define the so called trust fund, the purposes of the trust, the
limitations of the trust or the rights of beneficiaries in the
trust. It is simply alleged defendant was incorporated as a
corporation sole with the right to acquire, hold, dispose of
such real and personal property as may be conveyed to or
acquired by it for the benefit of the members of the Church
for the benefit of religion, works of charity and for the purpose of worship.
In the second cause of action the plaintiff attacks the
sale by Salt Lake City of the Forest Dale Golf Course to this
defendant. The sale is alleged to be void solely because all of
the members of the city commission were members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, hereinafter referred to as the Church, and so were disqualified to particiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pate in the sale and because the city did not proceed with the
sale in the proper manner. There are no allegations involving
this defendant in any unauthorized activity.
In the first cause of action plaintiff alleges he was once
a member of the Church and had once paid tithing and had
made contributions to the Church. A t the hearing on the
motions in the lower court and in his written brief, plaintiff
conceded that he was not a member of the Church and that
he had no standing to question the use of the funds of the
Church. In an attempt to overcome the fatal defect of having
a plaintiff who had no interest in the so called trust fund of
this defendant, and so had no status to question the use to be
made of the same, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion on
behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Fausett to intervene. Their complaint
in intervention alleged they were members of the Church and
had paid tithes and other contributions to the Church. They
adopted the allegations of the original complaint. Any further analysis of the complaint that may be necessary will be
made in the course of our argument to avoid repetition.
This defendant relies upon the following points for an
affirmance of the judgment of dismissal by the lower court:
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF, N O T BEING A MEMBER OF T H E
C H U R C H , HAS N O INTEREST I N T H E C H U R C H
PROPERTY A N D HAS N O S T A N D I N G I N C O U R T
T O QUESTION T H E USE MADE OF C H U R C H FUNDS,
A N D FOR THIS REASON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE
OF A C T I O N FAILS T O STATE A CLAIM U P O N
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WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS
DEFENDANT.
POINT TWO
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS IT FAILS
TO ALLEGE: (a) THAT ONLY TRUST FUNDS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WILL NECESSARILY BE USED TO
PURCHASE THE FIRST SOUTH PROPERTY; AND
(b) THE NATURE OF THE TRUST UNDER WHICH
THE FUNDS OF THIS DEFENDANT ARE CLAIMED
TO BE HELD IN TRUST, THE PURPOSE OF THE
TRUST OR WHEREIN THE CONTEMPLATED
TRANSACTION WILL VIOLATE THE TRUST AS SO
DEFINED.
POINT THREE
PARAGRAPH 20 OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION ATTEMPTS TO ALLEGE WHEREIN THE
TRANSACTION COMPLAINED OF IS NULL AND
VOID AS TO THIS DEFENDANT, BUT SUCH ALLEGATIONS FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE HAD AGAINST THIS
DEFENDANT.
POINT FOUR
SINCE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE
CHURCH, AND SO HAS NO STATUS TO QUESTION
THE USE PROPOSED TO BE MADE OF CHURCH
FUNDS, THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS LIMITED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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TO A SUIT BY A TAXPAYER TO RESTRAIN A SALE
OF CITY PROPERTY AND FAILS TO STATE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS
DEFENDANT.
POINT FIVE
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR GENERAL
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES CREATE NO TRUST OR
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PERSON CONTRIBUTING.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE MOTION OF LYNN
AND FIAMETTA FAUSETT TO INTERVENE IN THIS
ACTION.
POINT SEVEN
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A DISREGARD
OF THE SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY OF ZIONS
SECURITIES CORPORATION AND TO MAKE THIS
DEFENDANT ITS ALTER EGO AS A MATTER OF
LAW OR FACT.
POINT EIGHT
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW A BREACH OF TRUST.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR IN DISMISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO
THIS DEFENDANT.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF, NOT BEING A MEMBER OF THE
CHURCH, HAS N O INTEREST IN THE CHURCH
PROPERTY AND HAS N O STANDING IN COURT
TO QUESTION THE USE MADE OF CHURCH FUNDS,
AND FOR THIS REASON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE
OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST THIS
DEFENDANT.
There are numerous cases which hold that a person who
has left the Church, or has been excommunicated, has no
status to question the use being made of Church funds or
property, nor can he stand for or represent those who are
members. On this point we cite the following:
NANCE V. BUSBY, 91 Tenn 303,14 LRA 801,18 SW
874. Here property was conveyed to the Baptist Church with
a specific trust to be devoted to a specific and definite faith
and order. Plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and members of the Church, charged that the property so conveyed
was being used to teach principles contrary to the established
order. The court says:
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"There may be persons associated with them
(plaintiff) in sympathy and interest, who are not
expelled members of the church, but, if this is so,
complainants cannot stand for or represent such persons. Excommunicated members, whose names have
been by the valid action of the church expunged from
the roll of members, cannot stand for and represent
members. They are not of the same class."
" N o t being members of this church, they are not
beneficiaries under the conveyance by which the
church holds its church. They have, therefore, no
status as enables them to question the use of the property by the defendants. The result is that notwithstanding the force and effect of the verdict, the
chancellor should have dismissed the bill."
This case is followed in K I T T I N G E R V. C H U R C H I L L ,
292 NYS 35, 51, the court holding that voluntary contributions are not impressed with any trust, express or implied.
The case of Kittinger v. Churchill is followed in
GETHESEMANE L U T H E R A N C H U R C H V. Z A C H O ,
92 N W 2d 905, which quotes therefrom as follows:
"The usual rule applicable to religious societies is
that the rights of a member are dependent on the continuance of his membership and when he ceases to be
a member his rights and beneficial interest in the
society's property ceases, and he no longer has standing to sue in relation thereto. N o r does the fact that
plaintiff may have made contributions to this association give him any right after his withdrawal to sue in
relation to its affairs."
STEWART V. JARRIEL, 59 SE 2d 368, 206 Ga. 855.
The court said:
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"An expelled member of a church has no interest
in the church property, and excommunicated members whose names have been expunged from the
church membership roll by the valid action of the
church cannot stand for and represent members of the
church in an action to prevent the diversion of church
property from its lawful uses."
RODGERS V. BERNETT, 65 SW 410 and P A R T I N
V. T U C K E R 172 So. 89. These cases cite and quote with approval from N A N C E V. BUSBY, SUPRA.
T H O M A S V. LEWIS 224 KY 307, 65 SW 2d 255. The
court says:
"If the congregation has irregularly removed
officers, excluded members, diverted funds, or been
guilty of any other irregularity, the correction of such
abuses rests with the body of membership of the
church.'
See also APOSTOLIC HOLINESS U N I O N V. K N U D SEN 123 P 4 7 3 .
From the foregoing authorities it is clear that plaintiff,
not being a member of the Church, has no right or standing
to question the right or authority of this defendant or Zions
Securities Corporation to use funds to acquire a site to be sold
to the Federal Government for a federal building site, or to
represent members of the Church in such action. Consequently, the first cause of action fails to state a claim upon
which any relief can be granted against this defendant.
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POINT TWO
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS IT FAILS
TO ALLEGE: (a) THAT ONLY TRUST FUNDS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WILL NECESSARILY BE USED TO
PURCHASE THE FIRST SOUTH PROPERTY; AND
(b) THE NATURE OF THE TRUST UNDER WHICH
THE FUNDS OF THIS DEFENDANT ARE CLAIMED
TO BE HELD IN TRUST, THE PURPOSE OF THE
TRUST OR WHEREIN THE CONTEMPLATED
TRANSACTION WILL VIOLATE THE TRUST AS SO
DEFINED.
(a) It is alleged that Zions Securities Corporation, hereinafter called Zions, is a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Utah, all its capital stock, except to
qualify directors, being owned by this defendant. There is no
allegation that Zions may not, under its articles of incorporation, engage in the ordinary commercial transactions. Nor
are there any allegations to the effect that the only assets of,
and only funds available to, Zions are trust res, or res impressed with a limitation of any kind. Nor are there any allegations that the only funds available to Zions in connection
with the transaction under consideration must of necessity
come from trust funds held by Corporation of the President.
It is not to be presumed that Zions can not hold or disburse money in the ordinary commercial sense. It is a corporation organized for profit under the laws of Utah. In the
absence of any allegation to the effect that by its articles of
incorporation it can only hold and disburse trust funds, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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inference must surely prevail that it holds and uses its property and funds in the ordinary commercial sense, the same as
any other corporation organized for profit.
There being no allegation as above indicated the complaint fails to state a cause of action, for without such allegations there can be no basis upon which to restrain Zions, or
this defendant, from purchasing or providing funds with
which the Chamber of Commerce will purchase the property
from the city. Plaintiff is a stranger both to Zions and this
defendant. He owns no stock in Zions and he has no connection with this defendant. He has no standing to question
the right of either to assist in the acquisition of a site for a
federal building.
(b) As heretofore pointed out, nowhere in the complaint is there any attempt to define the so called trust fund,
the purpose of the trust, the limitation of the trust, or the
rights of beneficiaries in the trust. All that is alleged is that
this defendant has a trust fund.
There is no allegation that the donors, in making their
contributions to the Church, by tithes or otherwise, imposed
any trust terms. There are no allegations that such tithes or
contributions were donated to this defendant. The fact is
they were not. They were contributed to the Church as such.
This defendant being merely a legal instrument to hold title
to such property as may come to it.
This defendant as a corporation and the Church as an
unincorporated religious society are two separate and distinct
entities. In H U N D L E Y V. COLLINS, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So.
575, the court says:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
"These provisions of the Code for incorporation
of churches or religious societies, and all powers conferred thereunder, relate alone to their properties or
temporalities, and have no reference to churches or
societies as such, which bodies, as spiritual or ecclesiastical organizations, exist independent of their
charters. A church or religious society may exist for
all the purposes for which it was organized independently of any incorporation of the body under the
statutes of the state.
"Wherever there is an incorporated church, there
are two entities, the one the church as such, not owing
its ecclesiastical or spiritual existence to the civil law,
and the legal corporation, each separate though closely
allied. . . . The foregoing is quite sufficient to show
that the spiritual entity called a church, made up of
members belonging to it, existing without any special
law to that effect, is a different and distinct body in
the contemplation of law, from the same body when
incorporated under the statutes for the purpose—the
two having different functions to perform the one
religious and the other civil . . . 'The two bodies, viz:
the corporation and the church, although one may
exist within the pale of the other, are in no respect
correlative. The objects and interest of one are moral
and spiritual; the other deals with things purely
temporal and material/ "
It is necessary to look to Church polity, rather than to
this defendant's articles of incorporation to determine the
nature and terms of any trust, if any trust exists. This is
clearly illustrated in the case of BENDEWALD V. LEY, 39
N . D . 272, 168 N ¥ 693, where the court sustained a general
demurrer to the complaint, saying:
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"The complaint contains no allegations of the
ultimate facts, upon which the decision of the case
upon its merits must be based. The complaint is wholly
devoid of allegations as to church polity except as the
constitution affords an indication of its principles of
government, and without allegations supplementing
the constitution in this particular and without evidence
in support of such allegations, it cannot be determined
ultimately whether or not the defendants have exceeded the powers vested in them as executive officers
and members of the congregation. A plaintiff in an
action of this character should not leave open to conjecture the matter of the minority right upon which
the claim to relief is based."
The case of W A T S O N V. JONES, 13 Wall 679, 20
LEd 666, classifies the cases before the courts involving controversies over church property into three classes:
1. Property held under the terms of an express trust.
2. Property held by a religious congregation which by
the nature of its organization is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations and so far as
church government is concerned owes no fealty or
obligation to any higher authority.
3. Property held by a religious congregation which in
turn is a subordinate member of some general organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical
tribunals having control.
It is obvious that the instant case involves the second
classification. The court held that under this classification the
property is not held under a specific trust or for a trust that
can be controlled by a minority, or that may not be used for
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such purposes as the majority, or the officers in whom have
been invested the power of control, may determine even
though they have in some respects changed their religious
views.
Certainly the courts should not attempt to intrude into
the manner in which a religious body may use its funds upon
such scant and inadequate allegations as are contained in
plaintiff's complaint. This would be real interference by the
state into matters of religion. If a church member wants to
have a civil court pass upon the polity of his church, the least
that should be required is that he definitely alleged the facts
upon which he claims a right to relief. Especially should this
be true when he seeks to invoke the extraordinary power of
injunction to restrain the Church in its activities.
POINT THREE
P A R A G R A P H 20 OF T H E FIRST CAUSE OF A C T I O N ATTEMPTS T O ALLEGE W H E R E I N T H E
T R A N S A C T I O N COMPLAINED OF IS N U L L A N D
V O I D AS T O T H I S D E F E N D A N T , BUT SUCH ALLEGATIONS FAIL T O STATE A CAUSE OF A C T I O N
U P O N W H I C H RELIEF C A N BE H A D AGAINST T H I S
DEFENDANT.
(a) Paragraph (a) recites that since this defendant,
through Zions, already has a federal building site at the
Lafayette School site, it is estopped to acquire another site,
the First South Site. This objection is wholly specious and
frivolous. It is predicated on the proposition that since there
is only one federal building in contemplation, ipso facto,
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there can not be two sites, hence one having been acquired by
Zions, but not by the government, Zions may not obtain
another in the hope that the second will be acceptable to the
government in place of the first. The final decision in the
matter is with the federal government. If it chooses to acquire the Lafayette site the First South site will not be used.
If it chooses the First South site the Lafayette site will not be
used.
In his complaint, Paragraph 11 and 12, first cause,
plaintiff alleges that an action is pending to declare the
acquisition of the Lafayette site illegal. If this proves correct
there cannot be an estoppel to acquire the First South site. To
claim an estoppel plaintiff must take a position contrary to
that of his counsel, Mr. Musser, who brought the action to
set aside the acquisition of the Lafayette site because certain
members of the school board voting for the sale of that site to
Zions were disqualified because of conflicting interests. Are
plaintiff and his counsel trying to blow hot and cold?
Further, the plaintiff is in no position and has no status
to plead an estoppel. The elements of an estoppel are not
present.
19 AM. Jur. Page 732. Section 34:
" N o t only must the party claiming an estoppel
have believed and relied upon the words or conduct of
the other party, but also he must have been thereby
induced to act, or to refrain from acting, in such a
manner and to such an extent as to change his position or status from that which he would otherwise
have occupied."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
Section 35, Page 735:
"Estoppel rests largely upon injury or prejudice
to the rights of him who asserts it. Since the function
and purpose of the doctrine are the prevention of
fraud or injustice, there can be no estoppel where
there is no loss, injury, damage, or prejudice to the
party claiming it."
(b) Here plaintiff asserts this defendant and Zions have
no right to use trust funds to pay for a site for a federal
building. This point is covered by what has already been
written and further discussion yet to be made.
(c) and (d) In paragraph 20 (c) and (d) plaintiff is
complaining against the right and authority of the two church
corporations to do the things alleged. In other words, plaintiff
claims these corporations are exercising a franchise or privilege
not conferred upon them by law. This is an attack in the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding and comes under Rule
65B (b) 1. Rule 65B (c) requires the action be brought by
the Attorney General in the name of the state. Rule 65B (d)
permits a private person to bring the action only if the
attorney general fails to do so after notice. It also requires the
person to file an undertaking, upon filing the complaint, to
pay any judgment for costs or damages recovered against him
in such action. There is no allegations that notice has been
given the attorney general to bring the action to test the
right of these corporations to do the things complained of,
nor has any bond been filed. Further, plaintiff does not show
a special interest in the matters complained of.
STATE V. R Y A N , 41 Utah 327, 125 P 666. Here the
court held that a person could not bring quo warranto to
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test the sufficiency of the organization of a high school district, showing no other interest than a resident and taxpayer
in the district. Such an interest was common to all. He must
have a special interest in the matter and the Attorney General must have refused to bring the action.
PEOPLE EX REL BYERS V. G R A N D RIVER
BRIDGE COMPANY, 13 Colo. 11, 21 P 898. Plaintiff
brought suit to dissolve defendant corporation, alleging the
district attorney refused to bring the action. He was not a
stockholder and had no interest in the corporation other than
the corporation had appropriated some of his land on the
river bank on which to rest its bridge. The court says:
"If the defendant corporation has violated the
law, either by doing some forbidden act or by neglecting to do some act enjoined upon it, it is not every
person who may call it to account for such violation.
As a general rule, prosecutions for wrong done to the
public must be instituted by the state through its properly authorized agents, while the individual can only
sue for injuries peculiarly affecting him, and the provision of the code permitting an action in the nature
of a quo warranto to be brought by a purely private
party, upon the neglect or refusal of the district attorney to bring such action, must be construed with
reference to this general rule."
PEOPLE V. BLEECKER ST. & F.F.R. CO. 125 NYS
1045, aff. 95 N E 1136, 201 N Y 594. Action by the people to
have certain parts of a special franchise to operate a street
railway on streets of Manhattan forfeited and annulled because unlawfully held. O n the matter of quo warranto the
court says:
i
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"At common law equity did not have jurisdiction
in an action for relief such as that here demanded, but
the Attorney General was vested with authority to
maintain quo warranto for such relief at common law.
The legislature, in abolishing the writ of quo warranto, did not intend to deprive the court of jurisdiction in cases of this kind. It was merely intended to
change the form of procedure, and that relief which
formerly was obtained by quo warranto and by scire
facias, should be had in actions or by motions as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. We should
expect, therefore, to find by some appropriate provision of the Code of Civil Procedure authority conferred on the Attorney General to maintain such an
action, and we think it was conferred by sec. 1948,
subdivision 1: 'The Attorney General may maintain
an action, upon his own information, or upon the
complaint of a private person, in either of the following causes: (1) Against a person who usurpos, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises within the state
a franchise, or a public office, civil or military, or an
office of a domestic corporation/ "
The court held the word "person" in this section applied
to a corporation, as the term "person" includes a corporation.
This case was followed and quoted from in STATE V.
B U R M I N G H A M W A T E R W O R K S COMPANY, 185 Ala.
388, 64 So. 23, A N N CAS 1916 B 166.
51 C J p a g e 339, Sec. 47.
"Ordinarily a quo warranto proceeding to oust
individual from exercising franchises and privileges of
a corporation without authority of law, to forfeit the
charter of a private corporation or to oust it from exercise of the powers or franchises not conferred by
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law, may and should, be instituted by the attorney
general or other appropriate officer, ex officio on
behalf of the state, and not by a private citizen or
relator who has no interest in the corporation."
The same is found in 74 CJS Page 229, Sec. 30 ( 2 ) .
7 4 C J S Page 222, Sec. 28:
"Under the statutes of a number of jurisdictions,
the institution of a quo warranto proceeding by a
private citizen is authorized. Regardless of the variance in their language the statutes are generally construed not to authorize the institution or maintenance
of a quo warranto proceeding by a private person
unless, according to the decisions, he has a special or
personal or peculiar interest which is distinct from
that of the public."
(e) In this paragraph the plaintiff alleges that the purchase of the First South site will violate the provisions of
Section 4, Articles 1 of the Utah Constitution which provides
there shall be no union of church and state and shall not
dominate the state or interfere with its functions. The question to be resolved is: wherein would the purchase by the
federal government of a site for a federal building from this
defendant or Zions violate this provision?
The term "state" must refer to the State of Utah. Certainly Utah was not legislating for the U.S. or for any of its
states, except for itself. The text of the section shows this. If
there is any union or domination or interference in this transaction it does not affect the State of Utah, as it is not acquiring the site and will not be affected by the transaction here
involved.
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T o violate these provisions there must be shown something in the nature of a hazard tending toward breaking
down the separation of the church and state. In E W I N G V.
HARRIES, 68 Utah 452, 250 P 1049, where the election of
Harries as sheriff was challenged on the ground that church
officials had urged the church members to unite and elect
Harries, which action, it was charged, constituted a violation
of sec. 4, Art. I, the court says:
"It is pertinent to ask in what way, if at all, does
the fact, if it be a fact, that a large number of church
members unite or join their efforts in bringing about
the election of a particular person to a particular
office, in this case County Sheriff, dominate the state
or interfere with its functions? The state itself is not
concerned whether A or B is elected to a particular
office; but the people may be greatly interested. It is
not the function of the state either to nominate or to
choose candidates. This is purely a political question
entrusted to the people while acting in their political
capacity as electors."
Likewise, the state is not concerned in the selection by
the federal government of a site on which to erect a federal
building. It is not the function of the state to select or to
control the selection of such site. That is the matter solely for
the federal government.
T H O M A S V. D A U G H T E R S OF U T A H PIONEERS,
197 P2d 477. The court held that appropriation of
$150,000.00 by the state for erecting a Pioneer Memorial
Building to be under the auspices of the Daughters of the
Utah Pioneers did not violate this constitutional provision.
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After reviewing the facts and history leading to the enactment by the legislature the court asks:
"Is the picture now submitted to us one that
evidences a potential hazard in the nature of a step
toward breaking down that separation of church and
state."
We also ask the same question.
(f) Here plaintiff pleads the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Section 7,
Article 1, Utah Constitution. We submit that these constitutional provisions have not the slightest application in the case
now before the court, due process having been defined by this
court in RIGGINS V. D I S T R I C T C O U R T OF SALT
LAKE C O U N T Y , 89 Utah 183, 57 P2d 645 as follows:
"Due process of law requires that notice be
given to the person whose rights are affected. It hears
before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial."
H o w is plaintiff being deprived of due process? He has
no interest in the so-called trust funds. He alleges the funds
are held for the benefit of the members of the church and
that he is not a member. What notice or process has he failed
to receive? The principals to this transaction are not complaining about want of due process.
Next he invokes the constitutional provision against taking private property for public use without just compensation. Whose property is being taken and who is taking it? The
Federal Government is not taking any of plaintiff's property
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nor are the two church corporations. There is no element of
taking involved. There is a sale which will have to be on terms
agreeable to both buyer and seller.
TANNER V. PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRIGATION COMPANY 40 Utah 105, 121 P 534. The court
held:
"The burden of showing the damage which the
owner will suffer rests on him."
Here the plaintiff sought to enlarge a canal and the
owner of the canal easement sought right to compensation.
The court held that he had not shown any damages and
therefore could not complain.
EDEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. DISTRICT
COURT WEBER COUNTY, 61 Utah 103, 211 P 957. Here
it was held that a water user may not object to an act of
legislature which empowers the State Engineer to adjudicate
waste water. No one has a vested right in waste water. Hence,
no one is deprived of any right when required not to waste
water.
POINT FOUR
SINCE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE
CHURCH, AND SO HAS NO STATUS TO QUESTION
THE USE PROPOSED TO BE MADE OF CHURCH
FUNDS, THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS LIMITED
TO A SUIT BY A TAXPAYER TO RESTRAIN A SALE
OF CITY PROPERTY AND FAILS TO STATE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CLAIM UPON
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W H I C H RELIEF C A N BE G R A N T E D AGAINST T H I S
DEFENDANT.
Since it is conceded that plaintiff is not a member of the
Church and has no standing in court to question use of
Church funds this at once eliminates all issues in relation to
that feature of the case. All that is left of the first cause of
action is an attack by a taxpayer upon the action of the city
in selling or agreeing to sell the First South property. This
being true there is no cause of action alleged against this defendant.
If this defendant is to be retained as a defendant at all
it would only be on the remote, indirect, intangible interest
that might be involved in the city being restrained from selling its property to be used as a federal building site. The first
cause of action clearly fails to allege any pecuniary or property interest on the part of this defendant in the transaction
that would be affected by restraining the city from selling.
All that is alleged is that the "purported bid made by Gus P.
Backman was so made at the solicitation of the defendant,
Corporation of the President, and its agent and owned defendant, Zions Securities Corporation." Whoever takes title
from the city is a mere conduit through which title will pass
to Federal Service Administration. N o beneficial interest will
be acquired by such grantee. The conveyance can be made
directly to the Federal Service Administration without invading any rights of this defendant.
The situation covered by the plaintiff's allegations is the
same as if I were to become interested in seeing that " A " obtained a certain site for a home. I solicit " B " to submit a bid
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to the seller to purchase the home and "B M in turn would see
that " A " obtained the property for his home, or that the
property was deeded directly to " A . " I would not be a
proper or necessary party to an action brought by " C "
against the seller to prevent the sale nor would I have such an
interest as would permit me to intervene in such action. Such
a transaction would not give me any interest in the property.
I would be a mere volunteer, pure and simple. All that could
happen to me, if the seller were restrained, would be the personal disappointment arising from the fact that " A " did not
get the home site involved. N o property right of mine would
be invaded or affected.
P O I N T FIVE
V O L U N T A R Y C O N T R I B U T I O N S FOR GENERAL
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES CREATE N O T R U S T O R
BENEFICIAL INTEREST I N T H E PERSON C O N TRIBUTING.
As heretofore pointed out, there are no allegations in
the complaint which explain or define the manner in which
funds are received by the Church. Tithes and contributions
are mentioned, both of which constitute voluntary contributions. There are no allegations that these are made by
Church members with any specific restrictions as to the application or use to be made of them.
In C A D M A N MEMORIAL C O N G R E G A T I O N A L
SOCIETY V. K E N Y O N , 306 N Y 151, 116 N E 2d 481,
affirming 111 NYS 2d 808, the court says:
"Gifts to religious or charitable corporations to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
aid in carrying out the purposes for which they are
organized, either by expending the principal of a bequest or the income of a bequest to be invested in perpetuity, does not create a trust in any legal sense."
It was pointed out in the decision in 111 NYS 2d 808,
which decision was affirmed by the case above referred to,
that if the religious body attempts to violate the charter
powers the donors may protect themselves through an action
by the attorney general to compel use of the funds for the
purposes for which they were given.
CLARK V. SISTERS OF SOCIETY OF T H E H O L Y
C H I L D JESUS, 117 N ¥ 107. The court held:
"The general rule appears to be that, where
property is conveyed directly to a corporation to hold
for purposes for which the corporation was created,
no trust for the benefit of others arises.
"We are unable to see any legal principle upon
which a charitable trust in this property can be established, and if no trust was created by the deed of conveyance, the plaintiffs in this action have no interest
which qualifies them to maintain the action."
I N RE H E N R I K S O N ' S ESTATE, 203 N ¥
(MINN.)

778

Decedent devised the residue of his estate to the Swedish
Baptist General Conference in Sweden, the property to be
reduced to cash and invested, the income to be used to pay the
salary of a Baptist Minister in certain areas in Sweden, the
principal not to be used to pay salaries. The court held:
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"The bequest being to an entity having capacity
to take and administer the same under the Laws of
Sweden, it is not necessary to determine whether under
our laws a void or illegal trust was attempted. But, the
bequest being for missionary or charitable purposes to
an organization created to carry out such purposes
may be upheld under our statute as a bequest absolute
to the agency as a gift upon condition.
"If the bequest in this case had been made to a
corporation organized for the purpose for which the
gifts were made, the education of a young men for the
priesthood, the corporation would take the bequest
absolutely, as the beneficiary, and not in trust."
Also I N RE HAVSGAARD'S ESTATE, 283 N ¥ 130,
the court says:
"A gift to a corporation or organization to enable it to carry out some or all the purposes for which
it was formed does not create a trust."
Quoting from page on Wills, 2d ed., Volume 2, Sec.
1049, Second Edition and citing a number of cases.
The court goes on to use this language:
"The rule above announced has had a general application. The reason underlying the rule being that
the purpose for which the property is left, being a
part of the church and a department of the church itself, that both the legal and equitable title vests in the
church and this being true the equitable title merges
in the legal title. A person cannot be a trustee for himself."
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ZABEL V. STEWART, 109 P 2d 177, Kansas; the
court says:
"Generally it has been held that where a gift is
given to a corporation for the accomplishment of a
purpose for which the corporation was formed, the
gift is absolute and not in trust, and more specifically,
where a gift is made to a religious or charitable corporation to aid in carrying out the purposes for which it
was formed, it does not create a trust in any legal sense
and it is not to be judged by any of the well-known
rules pertaining to the Law of Trusts as applied to
individuals."
P O I N T SIX
T H E TRIAL C O U R T C O M M I T T E D N O E R R O R
I N REFUSING T O G R A N T T H E M O T I O N OF L Y N N
A N D FIAMETTA FAUSETT T O I N T E R V E N E I N T H I S
ACTION.
Appellant Stone argues that the Court erred in refusing
to grant the motion of the Fausetts to intervene in this action.
H e is in no position to urge such error, if there is any error.
It was not his motion. His right of action, if any, stands or
falls upon his complaint, not upon the complaint in intervention. It may be comforting to have company in his antichurch crusade but he has no legal basis to assert error because
the court failed to give him such companionship. Nowhere
in the Appellant's brief is there any assertion of error on part
of the Fausetts. Perhaps, since the trial court simply did not
pass upon the motion to intervene, as there would be no cause
of action in which to intervene when plaintiff's complaint
was dismissed, there was no appealable judgment or order
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from which the Fausetts could appeal. But this would not invest plaintiff with the right to substitute himself for the
Fausetts to urge error.
In addition, neither plaintiff nor intervenors come
within Rule 24 (a) ( 2 ) , as a matter of right, or 24 (b) as a
matter of discretion.
(a) To qualify for intervention as a matter of right,
intervenor must come within this language of said rule:
"When representation of the applicant's interest
by an existing party is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action."
The only area in which intervenors are not adequately
represented by Stone in this action, is that involving use of
the Church's so-called trust fund, as alleged. Intervenors can
not add anything to Stone's interest as a tax payer and resident of Salt Lake City. They all have the same attorneys.
Since Stone has no status to question the use of the trust fund,
to allow Fausett to intervene would be the equivalent of
bringing a new action upon an entirely new issue, wholly foreign to the issues in the pending action. The plaintiff, as a
tax payer, is contesting the sale of City property. Intervenors
seek to prevent the Church from using its funds in making
the purchase, an entirely different and indirect approach to
an effort to enjoin the sale.
Furthermore, intervenors will not be bound by the
judgment dismissing the tax payer's suit. He can still test the
trust fund theory by separate action.
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2 B A R R O N & HOLTZOFF, Section 597, p. 213:
"Intervention as of right is not allowed, regardless of adequate representation, if the judgment could
not conclude the intervenors."
To the same effect is AR-TIK SYSTEMS, INC., V.
DAIRY Q U E E N 22 F R D 122 and S U T P H E N ESTATES
V. U N I T E D STATES, 342 US 19 LEd, holding the decree
or judgment must be res judicata of the rights sought to be
protected by intervention.
(b) To qualify for permissive intervention, intervenors
must show their claim and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. Intervenors do not come within this
rule. The only reason for their intervention is to have a plaintiff who is a member of the Church to question the use of the
trust fund. Stone has no standing to question such use and no
question either of law or fact in that regard could be raised
by him. To permit Fausett to intervene would be the equivalent of bringing in a new cause of action based upon issues of
law and fact not involved in the main action. This may not
be done, see STRICKLER E N G I N E E R I N G CORP. V.
MICHAEL F L I N N MFG. CO., 23 F R D 12.
In WILSON V. ILLINOIS C E N T R A L RAILROAD,
21 F R D 588, the Labor Union sought to intervene in an
action by a re-employed veteran who alleged the defendant
had failed to restore him to employment with full seniority.
Intervenor claimed the bargaining agreement between it and
the railroad was involved and might be interpreted adversely
to employees. The Court refused intervention, saying:
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"The pleadings of the original parties raise no
issues pertaining to the collective bargaining agreement between the federation and the defendant.
Additional parties always take additional time. Even
if they have no witnesses of their own, they are the
source of additional questions, objections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like, which tend to make the
proceedings a Donnybrook Fair."
4 Moore Federal Practice p. 67:
"Interventions may be denied where the intervenor has an adequate remedy in another pending
action or otherwise."
P O I N T SEVEN
T H E FIRST CAUSE OF A C T I O N FAILS T O STATE
FACTS SUFFICIENT T O W A R R A N T A DISREGARD
OF T H E SEPARATE CORPORATE E N T I T Y OF ZIONS
SECURITIES C O R P O R A T I O N A N D T O MAKE T H I S
D E F E N D A N T ITS ALTER EGO AS A MATTER OF
LAW O R FACT.
Plaintiffs seek, by the general allegation that this defendant owns all of the capital stock of Zions, and that Zions
is the agent of this defendant, to fuse the two corporate entities in this defendant and to disregard the corporate entity
and powers of Zions. We assert that such general allegations
are wholly insufficient to sustain such a conclusion.
13 AM. JUR., Section 6, Page 159:
"The corporate entity is distinct although all its
stock is owned by a single individual or corporation.
Consequently, such concentration of stock ownership
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does not alter the fact that title to the corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner
of the corporate stock. Likewise, the fact that the
stockholders or officers in two corporations may be
the same does not operate to destroy the legal identity
of either corporation. Moreover, the fact that one
corporation exercises a controlling influence over the
other through the ownership of its stock or through
the identity of stockholders does not make either the
agent of the other, or merge the two corporations
into one."
1 FLETCHER CYC. C O R P O R A T I O N S , Permanent
Edition, Page 158-160, Section 43:
"It is not enough that the shareholders and officers or managers in the corporations are identical, and
the mere fact that one owns all the stock of the other,
or substantially all, is not enough to warrant disregard.
Common officers and management is not incompatible with separate entities, or conclusive of identity.
Even active management for a proper object does not
always indicate identical entities. . . . A difference in
corporate powers, the held corporation having power
to do that which is beyond the powers of the other, is
an obstacle to the complete disregard of the former's
entity."
SURGICAL SUPPLY C E N T E R V. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, 118 Utah 632, 223 P 2d 593. The court says:
"Plaintiffs contend that the partnership owns all
of the stock of the two corporations with the exception of five qualifying shares; that these corporations
were organized merely to establish operating mediums
of the two businesses of the partnership, and hence,
the partnership, for the purposes of this statute should
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continue to be regarded as the employer and the new
companies should be entitled to the rate it has earned.
In advancing this argument plaintiffs overlook well
established principles of law relating to corporations.
A corporation is a statutory entity which is regarded
as having an existence and personality distinct from
that of its members or stockholders. This is so even
though the stock is owned by a single individual or
different corporations. The fact that the stockholders
of two corporations may be the same persons does not
operate to destroy the legal entity of both corporations.
CLAUDE N E O N L I G H T I N C . V. FEDERAL ELECT R I C COMPANY I N C . 236 NYS 692. Holds that a corporation formed by two others to do what neither could or
would do without the other cannot be disregarded as a separate entity.
To the same effect is a CORSICANA N A T I O N A L
BANK OF CORSICANA V. J O H N S O N , 251 US 68, 64
LED 141, where it was held that a national bank and a loan
company doing things the bank could not do maintain their
separate identity.
H . E. BRIGGS A N D COMPANY V. H A R P E R CLAY
PRODUCTS COMPANY, 150 WASH. 235, 272 P 962. The
court held:
"It is not enough to call for adjudicating two
corporations to be in legal effect one, that it merely
appears that one is owner of practically all of the stock
of the other, and that they are very intimately related
in jointly carrying on their business for the purposes
of mutual benefit. It must also appear that their
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property rights are so commingled and their affairs
so intimately related in management as to render it
apparent that they are, in fact and in interest, one,
and to have them regarded otherwise would work
fraud upon third persons."
N I C H O L S A N D C O M P A N Y V. SECRETARY O F
AGRICULTURE, 131 F. 2d 651. Here it was held that
courts are hesitant to destroy the corporate separateness of
parent and subsidiary where there is no evidence of evasion or
where it is clear that both the parent and subsidiary have a
legitimate separate existence.
GINAS V. L O E W S I N C . 75 NYS 2d, 421. Held that a
subsidiary corporation is an entity independent and apart
from its parent corporation and is not its alter ego.
LEDLOW V. GOODYEAR TIRE A N D RUBBER
COMPANY OF ALABAMA, 238 ALA. 35, 189 SO 78. The
court held:
"Affiliates of a corporation may have separate
identity though both are wholly owned by dominant
corporation, as where business of latter justifies creation of each to serve separate and distinct functions,
as where each aspect of its business is of such proportion and character as that it may be conducted to
better advantage by separate corporations; and they
each form essential features of a coordinated plan of
operation, and have separate corps of employees and
managers with separate facilities and arrangements,
and there is no confusing relations to mislead the public and no other fraudulent or evasive result is thereby
accomplished. They are not then identified as one."
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D U A R T E V. POSTAL U N I O N LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, 171 P 2d, 574. The court held:
"Before the courts will disregard the corporate
entity of one corporation and treat it as the alter ego
of another, even though the latter may own all of the
stock of the former, it must further appear that there
is such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality of the one corporation and the owner or
owners of its stock has ceased, and further, that the
observance of the fiction of separate existence would,
under the circumstances sanction a fraud or promote
injustice."
In the light of the foregoing it is clear that Zions is not
limited in its corporate powers and purposes to the corporate
powers and purposes of this defendant, a corporation sole
created under an entirely different and separate part of the
code governing corporations.
POINT EIGHT
T H E COMPLAINT FAILS T O STATE A CAUSE
OF A C T I O N BECAUSE I T FAILS T O ALLEGE FACTS
SUFFICIENT T O S H O W A BREACH OF TRUST.
Throughout his brief plaintiff repeats over and over
again the idea that this defendant, and Zions, hold a trust
fund and that this trust fund is being misused in the acquisition of a site for a federal building at First South Street. We
feel we have demonstrated that there is no trust property involved and that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which
would involve misuse of a trust fund. Assuming, however,
that this defendant holds trust property, and that plaintiff
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and intervenors have such an interest that will allow them to
sue this defendant for breach of trust, there is no breach of
trust alleged.
All that is alleged is that (Paragraph 17) if the property
is acquired by defendant Chamber of Commerce or Gus P.
Backman, this, and the other defendants, plan to induce the
General Service Administration to purchase the same for the
erection of a federal building site thereon. It is then alleged
(Paragraph 19) that under this plan it will be necessary for
this defendant or Zions, to advance for the purchase price several hundred thousand dollars to pay for such site in excess of
the amount that will be received from the federal government
for the site so furnished. In Paragraph 20 (b) it is alleged this
defendant nor Zions has any right to use trust funds held by
them to pay for a site for a federal building.
Under its articles of incorporation the objects to be accomplished by this corporation are defined as follows:
"Second: The object of this corporation shall be
to acquire, hold and dispose of such real and personal
property as may be conveyed to or acquired by said
corporation for the benefit of the members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious society, for the benefit of religion, for works of
charity and for public worship. Such real and personal property may be situated, either within the State
of Utah, or elsewhere, and this corporation shall have
power, without any authority or authorization from
the members of said Church or religious society, to
grant, sell, convey, rent, mortgage, exchange, or
otherwise dispose of any part or all of such property."
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This clearly indicates that it can acquire, hold and dispose of property for four separate purposes, namely:
1. For the benefit of the members of the Church, a religious society, which clearly indicates an entity separate and
distinct from this corporation.
2. For the benefit of religion.
3. For works of Charity.
4. For purpose of worship.
The "works of charity," so authorized, need not be confined to Church members but may take any desired form
within the meaning of these words. These are generic terms
and must be given their usual meaning. The Church, over the
years, has made contributions to all kinds of enterprises that
are not restricted to its members. Its contributions to the federal government, during World War I, of a vast quantity of
wheat, its donations to flood and disaster areas, its donations
to the United Funds and to the Boy Scouts of America are
classic illustrations.
According to Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Volume 2, Section 368, charitable purposes include:
" ( a ) Relief of poverty, (b) The advancement
of education, (c) the advancement of religion, (d)
The promotion of health, (e) Governmental or municipal purposes, (f) Other purposes, the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."
In Section 373, Restatement continues:
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"A trust for the erection or maintenance of public buildings, bridges, streets, highways, parks or other
public works or for other governmental or municipal
purposes is charitable." See comment (a).
A lengthy discussion of the definition of charitable purposes or trusts is found in 12 ALR 2d at Page 855. As stated
in IN RE H A R T S ESTATE, 151 Cal App. 2d 271, 311 P
2d 605:
"Gifts in aid of governmental purposes are uniformly held to be for charitable purposes."
See also SCOTT O N TRUSTS, 2d Edition, 1956, Page
2665.
This court in STAINES V. BURTON, 17 Utah 331,
53P 1015, followed this same rule and quoted Lord Camden's
definition of a charitable gift as "a gift to a general public
use, which extends to the poor as well as the rich." See also
10 Am. Jur., Page 585, Section 3, and 10 Am. Jur., Page 647,
Section 79, where it is stated that gifts to the government for
its general benefit or for the reduction of the state or national
debt are valid as charitable gifts. See also 50 ALR, Page 593598 and cases therein cited.
The motive of the donor is immaterial, 10 Am. Jur.,
Page 594, Section 13; Restatement of Law of Trusts, Volume 2, Section 368, Comment ( d ) .
There need not be a necessity for the charity sought to
be established, 10 Am. Jur., Page 593, Section 12. The court
will not inquire into the necessities. WILSON V. FIRST
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N A T I O N A L BANK, 164 Iowa 402, 145 N ¥ 948, Ann.
Cas. 1916 D 481.
The Church, from its very beginning, has fostered and
given financial support to all kinds of public endeavors. It has
fostered and promoted many industries calculated to benefit
non-members as well as members. For this it has a world wide
reputation, not limiting its efforts in that regard to any particular area.
The Church, through its members, settled this valley,
formed and built Salt Lake City, the recognized capital of its
religious and welfare activities. The church is profoundly interested, and rightly so, in beautifying and improving its
capital city. Because of the Church, and its far reaching activities and reputation, millions of people visit Salt Lake City.
It has become one of the great tourist attractions of the
nation.
Certainly the Church is deeply concerned and interested
in Salt Lake City having governmental facilities worthy of
its capital city. Certainly it is rightfully interested in seeing
that the eye sores that now house the public safety departments of its capital city be replaced and new facilities acquired, with a new modern federal building rising to replace
these obsolescent and inadequate facilities. Certainly it is
within the term "works of charity," as above defined, to
bring about such a result. Any money spent to accomplish
that objective can not by any stretch of the imagination be
termed a breach of trust. It is for the benefit, not only of
Church members, but all of the citizens of Salt Lake City and
the State of Utah.
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Assuming, therefore, that there is a trust and that funds
of such trust will be used to assist in accomplishing the above
result, there is no breach of trust. The action of this defendant in so using its funds is still within the powers enumerated
in its articles of incorporation and is within the purposes for
which it holds its funds.
POINT NINE
T H E TRIAL C O U R T D I D N O T ERR I N DISMISSI N G T H E SECOND CAUSE OF A C T I O N AS T O T H I S
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff, in his second cause of action, adopts Paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the first cause of action. Paragraph 1
alleges that he was a tithe payer and a contributor to the
Church and has an interest in the trust fund held by Zions
and this defendant. In Paragraph 3 he alleges the corporate
existence of this defendant. In Paragraph 7 he alleges the purposes of this defendant is to hold and disburse real and
personal property for the benefit of the members of the
Church, a religious society, for the benefit of religion, works
of charity and purpose of worship.
There are no allegations in the second cause of action
that involve this defendant in violation of a trust relationship
or in any excess of corporate power or in any activity of any
kind except it entered into a contract with Salt Lake City to
buy the Forest Dale Golf Course. Accordingly, any allegations concerning plaintiff's former membership, former payment of tithes and contributions and the existence of a trust
fund held by this defendant and plaintiff's interest therein
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are wholly immaterial and redundant and add nothing to the
second cause of action.
In final essence, this second cause of action is merely a
taxpayers suit against the city for entering into a contract to
sell the golf course because, first, all members of the city
commission voting for the contract were members of the
Church and so were disqualified from authorizing the contract, and, second, the city did not give any notice, did not
pass any valid authorization for the execution of said contract
or to declare said property was no longer useful for use as a
city park, or otherwise informing the citizens of Salt Lake
City that said park would be sold and abandoned as a park.
Plaintiff prays that the contract be declared null and void. It
thus appears there are no allegations stating a claim upon
which relief can be granted against this defendant.
CONCLUSION
From the plaintiff's complaint it is apparent that this
action is designed not to protect the public's interest in either
the preservation of public property or in the selection of a
public site for a federal building, but to serve some other purpose. The matter of the obsolesence of the police, fire and
health department properties were fully and openly aired in a
public hearing to which anyone could, and was invited to, be
heard. Evidence was taken, experts were consulted, committees of citizens made recommendations, all to the effect that
Salt Lake City was in urgent need of new facilities for its
public safety departments. Plaintiff and intervenors were
conspicuous by their absence. They now seek to litigate that
which has been laid finally at rest by the very tribunal whose
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sole jurisdiction it was to decide the matter, the city commission. There are no allegations of fraud, chicanery, capriciousness or other illegal aspects. Plaintiff simply denies that these
properties are in fact sufficiently obsolete for the purposes
for which they are used. That issue can not be re-hashed in an
action such as plaintiff has brought. The court has no jurisdiction to substitute its discretion for that of the city commission in a matter of this kind.
The purchase of the Forest Dale Golf Course was widely
publicized to provide a junior college site to be sponsored by
the Church. The purchase price was paid and the funds derived therefrom were spent by the city in acquiring and
improving a new golf course. More than a year passed before
plaintiff brought his action to question that sale. H e is guilty
of laches.
N o one having any standing in the Church has questioned the participation of the Church, whatever it may be,
in the two transactions. Plaintiff's solicitation for the Church
membership in his attempt to protect them from what he
considers an unauthorized use of Church funds, is touching
but of no legal efficacy. He has no interest. He has no standing in his self-appointed role of watchdog over Church funds.
To permit him, or his companions, the intervenors, in their
undisclosed purpose, to delve into the Church financial activities, its internal polity and to cast appersions upon its
integrity and purposes, under the specious and wholly inadequate allegations of plaintiff's complaint would not in
any manner promote justice or protect public interest, but
would in fact do just the reverse.
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We respectfully submit that no cause of action has been
alleged against this defendant. The judgment of dismissal
should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
Homer Holmgren
Attorney for Defendant and Respondents,
Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
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